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Comment 
Associated Press v. Meltwater: Are Courts Being 
Fair to News Aggregators? 
Dylan J. Quinn* 
The Associated Press (AP), a news cooperative, filed suit 
against Meltwater U.S. Holdings (Meltwater), a news 
aggregation service, for copyright infringement.1 Meltwater 
conceded that sending its clients snippets of AP articles was 
copyright infringement, but contended that its use of the 
copyrighted articles constituted fair use under the Copyright 
Act of 1976 (Copyright Act).2 In the alternative, Meltwater 
argued that AP had granted an implied license to redistribute 
the copyrighted articles.3 The United States District Court for 
the Southern District of New York (SDNY) held that 
Meltwater’s scraping of the Internet and sending snippets in a 
“news report” to clients was not fair use and that an implied 
license did not exist.4 This represents the first time a district 
court has ruled against a news aggregator by denying a fair use 
defense.5 Meltwater appealed to the Second Circuit, but the 
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 1. See Associated Press v. Meltwater U.S. Holdings, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 2d 
537, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 2. Id. at 541. 
 3. Id. at 561. AP actually filed six causes of action, but the copyright 
infringement claim was the central cause of action and only relevant claim for 
this analysis. Id. at 548. 
 4. Id. at 561 (holding that Meltwater was essentially a news clipping 
service that served as a substitute for the original article, that its use of the 
snippets was not “transformative,” and that the rejection of fair use furthered 
the purpose of the Copyright Act). 
 5. See generally Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation & 
Public Knowledge in Support of Defendants’ Opposition to Motion for 
Summary Judgment at 2–8, Associated Press v. Meltwater U.S. Holdings, 
Inc., 931 F. Supp. 2d 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 2:12-cv-1087-DLC-FM) 
[hereinafter Brief of Elec. Frontier Found.], available at https://www.eff.org/
node/73059 (discussing previous case law on the finding of fair use for news 
aggregators). 
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case was settled while waiting on appeal.6 The settlement 
provides that AP and Meltwater will begin working together in 
the future.7 
The court in AP v. Meltwater denied the fair use defense 
because Meltwater’s use was not transformative and effectively 
substituted for AP in the market,8 while the implied license 
defense was denied for both practical and policy reasons.9 The 
decision, although possibly providing the right outcome on 
these specific facts, presents a questionable interpretation of 
what is “transformative,”10 unconvincingly argues against the 
feasibility of an expanded implied license defense, and leaves 
questions going forward in terms of what differentiates a 
search engine that is afforded fair use and one that is not. 
In general, the court’s analysis of Meltwater’s fair use 
defense is important because it provides a look into how a court 
would apply the standard to a news aggregator. It has long 
been assumed that news aggregators are protected from news 
organizations and content providers by the fair use defense,11 
but this case provides evidence to the contrary. Furthermore, 
although the ruling correctly denied Meltwater’s fair use 
defense under current Second Circuit precedent,12 an expanded 
implied license doctrine in the context of online news media 
                                                          
 6. AP, Meltwater Settle Copyright Dispute, USA TODAY (July 29, 2013, 
11:53 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/07/29/ap-
meltwater-settle-copyright-dispute/2595769/ [hereinafter Associated Press] 
(discussing the cooperative agreement between AP and Meltwater that was 
agreed upon prior to appeal). 
 7. Id. 
 8. See infra Part II.A. 
 9. See infra Part II.B. 
 10. See Brief of Elec. Frontier Found., supra note 5, at 2–10 (arguing that 
the AP’s proposed interpretation of “transformative use” is too narrow and will 
stifle news aggregators and search engines from distributing news content to 
the public); see also Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 818–22 (9th Cir. 
2003) (explaining the transformative use of news articles employed by search 
engines and their benefit to the public). 
 11. See Nicole Marimon, Shutting Down the Turbine: How the News 
Industry and News Aggregators Can Coexist in a Post-Barclays v. 
Theflyonthewall.com World, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 
1441, 1472–74 (2013) (assuming other remedies are needed for news providers 
since the fair use defense provides protection for news aggregators). 
 12. See Associated Press v. Meltwater U.S. Holdings, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 2d 
537, 550–61, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (discussing Second Circuit precedent and 
holding that “Meltwater ha[d] failed to raise a material question of fact to 
support its fair use defense”). 
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presents an intriguing alternative to traditional copyright 
law.13 
The goal of this Comment is to discuss the impact, if any, 
the case will have on the relationship between news 
aggregators and news providers, and whether courts should 
apply the fair use factors in the same manner as the Meltwater 
court. Part I will introduce the current state of the online news 
industry, the fair use and implied license defenses, as well as 
the impact of news aggregators on news reporting. Part II will 
describe the Meltwater court’s holding and analysis. Part III 
will critique the court’s interpretation of “transformative use” 
and discuss implications and policy concerns regarding search 
engines and news aggregators. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A.  THE NEWS INDUSTRY’S ATTEMPT TO CAPITALIZE ON THE 
INTERNET 
The Internet seems to have altered every industry in some 
way, and the news industry is no exception. It is not that news 
providers are not attempting to effectively use the Internet; to 
the contrary, online revenues are at an all-time high.14 The 
main problem is attempting to capitalize on the Internet 
market so that the gains in online revenue make up for the 
decreases in print.15 Furthermore, while more sophisticated 
                                                          
 13. See Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1115–16 (D. Nev. 2006) 
(finding no copyright infringement where the copyright holder knew of the 
ability to opt out of a search engine by being able to cache and index the 
copyrighted material); Monika Isia Jasiewicz, Comment, Copyright Protection 
in an Opt-Out World: Implied License Doctrine and News Aggregators, 122 
YALE L.J. 837, 843–50 (2012) (arguing that the law should develop an opt-out 
standard, effectively allowing the implied use defense). 
 14. Rick Edmonds et al., The State of the News Media 2012, Newspapers: 
By the Numbers, STATEOFTHEMEDIA.ORG, http://stateofthemedia.org/2012/
newspapers-building-digital-revenues-proves-painfully-slow/newspapers-by-
the-numbers/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2014). 
 15. See id. (demonstrating that over the last two years the increases in 
online revenue did not make up for the losses in print). Furthermore, it is 
worth noting that print still comprises about 86.4% of overall revenue. Id. 
(taking the print revenue for 2011 divided by the total print and online 
revenue provides the 86.4%); see also Keiyana Fordham, Note, Can 
Newspapers Be Saved? How Copyright Law Can Save Newspapers from the 
Challenges of New Media, 20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 939, 
942–43 (2010) (discussing how newspapers used to hold a monopoly over 
providing news and connecting buyers and sellers through print advertising, 
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players may be better able to adapt to new trends, media 
outlets with less funding are being forced to close their doors.16 
While there is a seemingly infinite amount of variables leading 
to the industry’s inability to effectively capture revenue from 
its online media services, many believe that news aggregators 
are a leading cause.17 Amongst the various methods employed 
by news providers to combat aggregators, an actual judgment 
for copyright infringement against an aggregator may alleviate 
news providers’ concerns about news aggregators. 
The term “news aggregator” can encompass a variety of 
websites and online services, but most aggregators can be 
boiled down into two categories that both provide a middleman 
in between the original source and the consumer: “automatic” 
and “websites.”18 Automatic news aggregators operate using a 
search engine that automatically indexes copies of the articles 
it scrapes from the Internet, compiles headlines and excerpts, 
while providing a link to the original source.19 Website news 
aggregators perform similarly, but actually use a human editor, 
often adding commentary, summary, and insight to go along 
                                                          
but advertising is now migrating to the Internet); AP Sees Slight Revenue 
Decline in 2012, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 15, 2013), http://www.ap.org/
Content/AP-In-The-News/2013/AP-sees-slight-revenue-decline-in-2012 
(discussing the AP’s loss in revenues, and the need to severely cut back on 
operating costs and payroll). 
 16. See Edmonds et al., supra note 14 (noting that over the past five 
years, fourteen to twenty-one newspapers shut down annually). 
 17. See, e.g., David Sarno, Murdoch Accuses Google of News ‘Theft’, L.A. 
TIMES (Dec. 2, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/dec/02/business/la-fi-
news-google2-2009dec02 (discussing Robert Murdoch’s statements that 
aggregators use of news providers’ material is equivalent to theft). 
 18. See Fordham, supra note 15, at 946, 947–51 (stating that “[t]his Note 
will focus on two types of news aggregators: automatic news aggregators, and 
news aggregation websites”); see also Priya Barnes, The Prospects for 
Protecting News Content Under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 3 HARV. 
J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 201, 206–07 (2012) (distinguishing between “feed” 
aggregators, which compile news items from a variety of sources on multiple 
topics, and “specialty” aggregators, which compile news on particular topics). 
Barnes uses the terms “pure-play” and “hybrid” to represent “automatic” and 
“website,” respectively. Id. 
 19. Fordham, supra note 15, at 947. Search engines like Google News are 
an example, but so is the defendant in Meltwater. The defining characteristic 
is that no new commentary or insight is added to the original source. See id. 
(describing what is listed on automatic news aggregators’ websites, all of 
which comes from the original source). 
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with the original source.20 These categories are not exclusive, 
and as the industry evolves there will undoubtedly be a 
blending between the two. While some have categorized news 
aggregators into four categories,21 for the purposes of this 
Comment the main distinction will be drawn between those 
that add their own expressive content (websites), and those 
that automatically scrape the Internet and just republish 
pieces of the original source (automatic). 
News providers take the position that their publications, 
which take hours (maybe even days) to complete, are being 
exploited by aggregators who scrape the Internet and republish 
the work to their own consumers.22 This, news providers say, 
reduces consumer traffic to their sites, undermines their ability 
to get advertising revenue,23 and is akin to thievery.24 All the 
while, aggregators point out that they serve a valuable public 
purpose in that they further disseminate information, which 
leads to a more informed public.25 
Although it seems intuitive that news aggregators 
undermine the ability of news providers to operate in the 
market by attracting visitors away from the provider and to the 
aggregator, there is disagreement about whether this is 
                                                          
 20. See id. at 948–51 (describing how news aggregation websites operate 
and discussing, as an example, how a Gawker employee re-wrote a 
Washington Post article). The Huffington Post is a great example of this type 
of aggregator. While the categories seem mutually exclusive, aggregators may 
blur the lines between them, further complicating the legal framework and 
analysis of the issue discussed infra. 
 21. Marimon, supra note 11, at 1447 (distinguishing between feed, 
specialty, user-curated, and blog aggregators). 
 22. See Fordham, supra note 15, at 950. 
 23. Id. at 942–43. But see Jasiewicz, supra note 13, at 841 (“[T]here 
appears to be no direct empirical evidence that news aggregators are actively 
cutting into the news industry’s advertising revenue.”). 
 24. Sarno, supra note 17 (quoting News Corporation chairman Rupert 
Murdoch accusing aggregators of “almost wholesale misappropriation” that 
“[t]o be impolite, [is] theft”). 
 25. See Brief of Elec. Frontier Found., supra note 5, at 1. In support of 
aggregators, the amicus brief argues that a ruling against aggregators’ fair 
use defense would “sharply curtail the essential role fair use plays in 
facilitating online innovation and expression, restricting the use and 
development of services that allow users to find, organize and share public 
information.” Id. These valuable services that are offered are dependent on 
making intermediate copies and personal consumer uses such as time shifting. 
Id.; see also Barnes, supra note 18, at 209 (“By increasing consumers’ choice of 
access to the same information, news aggregators may provide a balancing 
pressure for dominant media to be less biased in their coverage.”). 
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actually the case.26 It appears that the revenue declines are not 
attributed so much to a lack of readership, as much as losses in 
advertising revenue.27 It is unclear if aggregators are actually 
taking away viewers from the original news provider as 
opposed to increasing traffic to the original source.28 As 
aggregators are becoming more prevalent on the Internet, the 
news industry has fought back, responding in various ways, 
like using paywalls and licensing organizations.29 The problem 
is that paywalls and online subscriptions are not working since 
not many people are willing to pay for the news.30 As attempts 
of erecting paywalls fail, it is logical to assume that legal action 
against news aggregators is the next step. While legal action 
has led to settlement agreements which provide that the 
                                                          
 26. See Edmonds et al., supra note 14 (noting that circulation losses are 
much less severe, indicating that the audience isn’t so much diminishing as 
much as advertising revenue is); see also Hsiang Iris Chyi & Angela M. Lee, 
Online News Consumption: A Structural Model Linking Preference, Use, and 
Paying Intent, 1 DIGITAL JOURNALISM 194, 196 (2013) (discussing research 
that shows “online newspaper use serves [as] entertainment, interpersonal 
communication . . . and information scanning,” indicating consumers are not 
interested in reading full articles on the Internet). Chyi & Lee conclude that 
consumers also are typically not willing to even pay for the news source 
(especially online) that the consumer prefers, illustrating the problem with 
news providers using paywalls and trying to collect revenue directly from 
online consumers. See id. at 206. 
 27. See Susan Athey & Markus Mobius, Local News Consumption: The 
Impact of Aggregators on Traditional Media, TECH. ACADEMICS POL’Y       
(Aug. 20, 2012), http://www.techpolicy.com/Blog/August-2012/Local-News-
Consumption-The-Impact-of-Aggregators-o.aspx (summarizing research that 
indicates aggregators may lead to increased local news consumption, but at 
the same time may be taking away from advertising revenue since clicking 
directly through to the article bypasses the news provider’s home page). 
 28. See id. 
 29. See Associated Press v. Meltwater U.S. Holdings, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 2d 
537, 542–43 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (discussing the numerous websites and 
aggregators that pay for license agreements with the Associated Press); 
Barnes, supra note 18, at 211–13 (2012) (discussing the various paywalls and 
digital access regimes employed by online news providers); Marimon, supra 
note 11, at 1449 (discussing NewsRight, a partnership licensing organization 
started by twenty-nine news organizations in 2011 with the goal of collecting 
royalties from aggregators). 
 30. Chyi & Lee, supra note 26, at 197 (discussing an international survey 
that shows approximately 80% of people would not pay for online news 
content). The study by Chyi & Lee shows that, overall, even if people prefer 
and desire to read certain news content, that does not make them more willing 
to pay. Id. at 205–06. 
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aggregator is to pay the provider a licensing fee,31 there is 
obviously no way a news provider can go after the thousands of 
websites that use its content. It is possible that an adverse 
judgment against a news aggregator for copyright infringement 
could dispel the notion that aggregators are protected under 
fair use, sending a message across the industry, but it is 
unclear if aggregators will actually respond to the message and 
change their business model. 
B.  THE COPYRIGHT ACT AND FAIR USE ON THE INTERNET 
Although the Copyright Act has continually been employed 
by news providers in recent years to go after search engines 
and news aggregators, the industry has historically relied on 
other doctrines for protection.32 About a century ago, AP won 
the landmark case International News Service v. Associated 
Press.33 The case created the “hot news” doctrine, which was 
intended to protect the time value of the news as a way to 
counteract unfair competition,34 all the while seemingly 
dismissing the idea of a copyrightable interest in the news.35 
Today, the hot news doctrine is a toothless cause of action that 
is completely inadequate in light of recent Second Circuit 
precedent.36 
If the hot news doctrine cannot be utilized by news 
providers, they can and are turning to the Copyright Act.37 
Some have raised concerns that the Copyright Act is 
                                                          
 31. See, e.g., Jeffrey D. Neuburger, A Brief History of AP’s Battles with 
News Aggregators, PBS (May 26, 2009), http://www.pbs.org/mediashift/
2009/05/a-brief-history-of-aps-battles-with-news-aggregators146/ (discussing a 
2006 settlement between Google and AP which required Google to pay 
undisclosed licensing fees for the use of AP’s content). 
 32. Id. (discussing the hot news doctrine). 
 33. Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239–40 (1918) 
(ruling against International News Service, holding that International News 
Service engaged in unfair competition by republishing the news procured by 
AP). 
 34. Neuburger, supra note 31. 
 35. Int’l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 234–35 (“We need spend no time, 
however, upon the general question of property in the news matter at common 
law, or the application of the copyright act, since it seems to us the case must 
turn upon the question of unfair competition . . . .”). 
 36. See Marimon, supra note 11, at 1460–61 (discussing how Barclay 
Capital Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, Inc., 650 F.3d 876 (2d Cir. 2011) leaves 
only a “ghostly presence” of International News Service v. AP). 
 37. See, e.g., Neuburger, supra note 31. 
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inadequate in preventing aggregators from republishing 
content38 since the Act expressly mentions “news reporting” 
under permissible fair uses.39 Furthermore, the Supreme Court 
has made clear that printing facts alone without some 
originality or creativity in their compilation is not 
copyrightable expression.40 Notwithstanding the alleged 
shortcomings of the Copyright Act, it has been employed by 
news providers in recent years41 and very well may represent 
the best weapon news providers have against aggregators. 
The Copyright Act was adopted to advance the arts and 
sciences by providing exclusive rights in an author’s work.42 In 
order to prevail in a copyright infringement action, a copyright 
holder must prove “(1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) 
copying of constituent elements of the work that are original.”43 
The bar is set low for authors/creators to gain copyright 
protection in their work, but that does not mean they will 
necessarily prevail since the Act allows for a fair use 
affirmative defense. 
The fair use defense is the most frequently invoked defense 
for those defending against allegations of copyright 
infringement.44 The fair use defense was codified into the 
Copyright Act from judicial precedent.45 Although the purpose 
                                                          
 38. See id. 
 39. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
 40. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 362–64 (1991) 
(holding that the re-publishing of names, telephone numbers, and directory 
information was not a copyrightable work since it lacked the originality 
required for copyright protection); Marimon, supra note 11, at 1463–64 
(discussing the shortcomings of the Copyright Act to protect the news industry 
in light of Feist Publications Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.). 
 41. See, e.g., Associated Press v. Meltwater U.S. Holdings, Inc., 931 F. 
Supp. 2d 537, 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 42. See generally A Brief Introduction and History, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., 
http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ1a.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2014) 
(explaining that copyright means “that body of exclusive rights granted by law 
to authors for the protection of their work”). 
 43. Arista Records L.L.C. v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110, 117 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(quoting Feist Publications, 449 U.S. at 361). 
 44. Fordham, supra note 15, at 951 (“When copyright owners seek to 
enforce their rights in court against infringers of their copyrighted works, the 
most commonly raised defense is fair use.”). 
 45. See id. (“Fair use is a judicial construct, codified into law at section 
107 of the 1976 Copyright Act . . . .”). See generally Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 
342, 344–45 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (distilling judicial precedent into 
the four factors that were eventually codified into the Copyright Act of 1976). 
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of copyright is to “promote science and the arts,”46 fair use 
provides the necessary breathing room to avoid rigid 
application of the statute by allowing courts to weigh various 
factors on a case-by-case basis.47 In granting an affirmative fair 
use defense, a court is to consider 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such 
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational 
purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount 
and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted 
work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential 
market for or value of the copyrighted work.48 
All of the factors are “to be explored, and the results weighed 
together, in light of the purposes of copyright.”49 
Copyright infringement suits involving the Internet are 
not unique to the news industry,50 but courts’ analyses of the 
fair use factors in the context of search engines, news 
aggregators, and online media are most relevant for this 
comment.51 Recent cases dealing with a search engine’s 
proposed fair use of copyrighted materials provides guidance 
into how a court would treat a news aggregator.52 Case law 
                                                          
 46. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994). 
 47. Id. at 577–78. 
 48. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). The first factor includes a two-part test to 
establish if the secondary use is for a commercial purpose and if the use is 
transformative. Fordham, supra note 15, at 953. After the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., lower courts put much less of 
an emphasis on whether or not the secondary use is for a commercial purpose. 
Id. at 953–54. The second factor is normally given the least weight in a court’s 
analysis. Id. at 954–55. 
 49. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578. 
 50. See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 
900–01 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (ruling against Napster’s fair use defense and in favor 
of music publishers); see also Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 
106 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding retransmission of radio broadcasts over the 
telephone did not constitute fair use). 
 51. See Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282, 293–94 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013), for the most recent SDNY case that has a direct impact on 
this Comment. The court in Authors Guild found that Google’s mass 
digitization of copyrighted books was fair use since converting the text into a 
digital format was transformative and the project constituted a massive 
benefit to society. Id. 
 52. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1163–68 (9th 
Cir. 2007) (granting search engine’s fair use defense of copyrighted images in 
search queries since the cached and index copy of the image did not supplant 
the need for the original and because of the public benefit provided by search 
engines); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 817–22 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(ruling that the search engine’s use of thumbnails in response to search 
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indicates that search engines, like Google, are protected by fair 
use due to the limited use of the copyrighted material53 and the 
immense benefit they afford society by increasing access to 
information.54 While aggregators can serve a similar function 
as search engines,55 not all aggregators are the same.56 
Aggregators can vary from search engines by charging a fee to 
consumers, using more of the copyrighted content, adding 
additional content, or by summarizing copyrighted content.57 
While case law indicates that search engines are afforded fair 
use, it is unclear how courts will differentiate between 
aggregators or other online media services that have functions 
similar to that of a search engine. 
C.  IN ADDITION TO FAIR USE, AGGREGATORS ARE NOW 
TURNING TO AN IMPLIED LICENSE DEFENSE 
While aggregators will heavily rely on fair use, the news 
providers themselves may look for protection from other 
sources outside of the Copyright Act. Some have argued that 
the news providers should lobby for new legislation targeted at 
aggregators.58 However, any additional legislation targeted at 
news aggregators has obvious First Amendment implications 
that must be considered.59 Some have discussed whether or not 
the news industry could find relief under the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act,60 but it is uncertain if this would be 
                                                          
queries was fair since the tiny version of the original image did not supplant 
the need for the original, the thumbnails were transformative, and because of 
the public benefit such search engines provide). 
 53. Authors Guild, 954 F. Supp. 2d at 286–87. 
 54. See, e.g., id. at 293–94. 
 55. See Associated Press v. Meltwater U.S. Holdings, 931 F. Supp. 2d 537, 
563–64 (mentioning that news aggregator employed the same “crawlers” to 
scan the Internet as search engines, and provides results to customers’ search 
queries). 
 56. See supra notes 18–21 and accompanying text (discussing the 
different types of news aggregators). 
 57. See supra notes 18–21 and accompanying text. This list is by no 
means exhaustive. 
 58. See Alfred C. Yen, A Preliminary First Amendment Analysis of 
Legislation Treating News Aggregation as Copyright Infringement, 12 VAND. J. 
ENT. & TECH. L. 947, 971 (2010). 
 59. Id. at 959–72 (discussing the impact of protecting ideas in news 
articles on free speech, and the fact that any aggregation control legislation 
would be analyzed under elevated First Amendment scrutiny). 
 60. See Barnes, supra note 18, at 208; Neuburger, supra note 31 
(discussing a district court’s ruling that “AP could pursue a claim under the 
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possible.61 Even with these other potential avenues, the most 
prevalent for the foreseeable future is the Copyright Act. 
Although the Copyright Act and the fair use defense is the 
primary statute (or doctrine) governing these type of suits,62 an 
implied license affirmative defense63 has been gaining traction. 
Since it is a non-exclusive license, it does not need to be in 
writing.64 Furthermore, it is a creature of contract law, 
meaning its existence primarily hinges on the party’s 
intentions.65 A common standard for demonstrating an implied 
license requires the alleged infringer to show that (1) the 
licensee requests the creation of the work; (2) the creator 
makes the particular work and delivers it to the licensee who 
requested it; and (3) the licensor intends that the licensee-
requester copy and distribute his or her work.66 It appears a 
court using the three-factor test would always rule against a 
news aggregator since the aggregator will have a difficult time 
showing they requested the work directly, and it was delivered 
to them via that request. However, not all courts follow this 
exact standard, and instead employ a more fluid standard 
focusing on the conduct and intentions of the parties.67 
                                                          
copyright management provision of the [Digital Millennium Copyright Act]” if 
the defendant “removed references to the AP as owner and author of the 
articles that it copied”). 
 61. Barnes overlooks the fact that the statute is geared towards anti-
trafficking and the circumvention of safeguards in place, but by crawling the 
Internet there is no circumvention of a pay-wall or anything. 
 62. See Fordham, supra note 15, at 947–48, 951. 
 63. See, e.g., Atkins v. Fischer, 331 F.3d 988, 992 (D.C. Cir. 2003) 
(“[A]lleged infringers have the burden of establishing an implied license.”). 
 64. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (leaving out nonexclusive licenses from the 
definition of “transfer of copyright ownership”); id. § 204 (stating attempted 
transfers of copyright ownership must be made in writing). 
 65. Associated Press v. Meltwater U.S. Holdings, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 2d 
537, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Since an implied license is a creature of contract 
law, the parties’ intent is a critical factor.”). 
 66. See Beholder Prods., Inc. v. Catona, 629 F. Supp. 2d 490, 494 (E.D. Pa. 
2009) (stating that “the Third Circuit referenced a three-factor test adopted by 
numerous other circuits (including the 9th, the 7th, the 5th and the D.C. 
Circuits) to determine whether or not an implied license was granted” and 
then listing and discussing the three factors). In Effects Associates the Court 
found an implied license granted by the special effects company to the 
moviemaker, the alleged infringer. Effects Assocs. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 
558–59 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 67. See Meltwater, 931 F. Supp. 2d at 562 (“Even those courts that do not 
require evidence of each of these three elements do require evidence of a 
meeting of the minds between the licensor and licensee such that it is fair to 
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Furthermore, it would not be out of the question for a 
jurisdiction to tweak the three-factor requirement to satisfy the 
needs of the particular industry, since it has been done 
before.68 
The leading example of a case utilizing a more expansive 
implied license standard that is relevant to news aggregators, 
is Field v. Google.69 In that case the District Court in Nevada 
agreed with Google that the copyright holder granted an 
implied license since it was aware of an industry standard that 
could have been employed to adequately prevent the search 
engine from using the copyrighted material, but failed to utilize 
it.70 This logic could seemingly be applied to all news service 
providers, meaning they would effectively have to “opt out” of 
having aggregators and search engines use their copyrighted 
works.71 Although there are questions about the feasibility of 
creating an industry wide opt-out system using the implied 
license doctrine,72 the argument provides a possible framework 
going forward for dealing with the complicated relationship 
between news providers and aggregators outside of fair use and 
the Copyright Act. 
                                                          
infer that the licensor intended to grant a nonexclusive license.”); see also 2 
PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 5:131 (2013) (discussing the Ninth and Fifth Circuits’ 
different variations and acceptable demonstrations of an implied license 
outside of the three factors commonly applied). 
 68. Since courts have altered the three factors to better suit industry 
practices in the film industry, what would stop a court from recognizing the 
unique nature of the news and the necessity to make a different standard? See 
Fontana v. Harra, No. CV 12-10708 CAS, 2013 WL 990014, at *8–9 (C.D. Cal. 
Mar. 12, 2013). 
 69. See Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1113–16 (D. Nev. 2006) 
(granting Google’s Motion for Summary Judgment based on an implied license 
defense since the copyright holder was aware of the industry standard which 
allows website owners to employ a meta-tag, which informs a search engine 
scraping the Internet not to pull that source). 
 70. Id. at 1115–16. 
 71. See Jasiewicz, supra note 13, at 843–47 (discussing how the Internet 
is an opt-out system, while traditional copyright law is an opt-in system where 
distribution rights prohibit reproduction without copyright holders 
affirmatively providing their consent). 
 72. E.g., id. at 845 (stating that “[h]istorically, implied licenses have only 
been found in copyright cases when there is direct dealing between just a few 
parties” and not in any context comparable to the Internet). 
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D.  IT IS UNCLEAR IF COURTS ACKNOWLEDGE THAT 
AGGREGATORS OFTEN INCREASE NEWS CONSUMPTION AND 
PROVIDE A BENEFIT TO SOCIETY 
Even if the Copyright Act affords some protection, it is odd 
that many cases settle.73 News providers presumably would 
want to set precedent in their favor and get rid of the long-held 
belief that aggregators are protected under fair use. It is 
without question that thousands of websites reuse news 
content without permission;74 however it is quite possible that 
the news providers do not want constricting legislation that 
will impair aggregators from coming into the market place. 
Publishers of news content may actually want aggregators, 
since they recognize the value of having their information 
reach a larger consumer base.75 This is supported by the fact 
that most settlements involving news providers and search 
engines (or news aggregators) lead to a mutually beneficial 
agreement, normally involving the payment of licensing fees.76 
Therefore it is questionable if any news provider actually cares 
about securing an adverse judgment against a news 
aggregator; that may be because they understand the positive 
impact and benefit they provide society by further 
disseminating information. 
Recent research supports the notion that news aggregation 
services likely increase the traffic to the original news 
providers and increase overall news consumption by 
consumers.77 One research study showed that when Google 
                                                          
 73. E.g., Kimberly Isbell, What’s the Law Around Aggregating News 
Online? A Harvard Law Report on the Risks and the Best Practices, NIEMAN 
JOURNALISM LAB (Sept. 8, 2010, 10:30 AM), http://www.niemanlab.org/2010/
09/whats-the-law-around-aggregating-news-online-a-harvard-law-report-on-
the-risks-and-the-best-practices/ (discussing AP v. All Headline News, the 
copyright claims maintained in the SDNY, and the eventual settlement). 
 74. See Marimon, supra note 11, at 1446–47 (discussing research that 
estimates that 75,000 websites reuse newspaper content without permission 
across the country). 
 75. See Mark Sableman, News Aggregation Services—Legal and Practical 
Perspectives, ASS’N BUS. INFO. & MEDIA COMPANIES, 
http://www.abmassociation.com/images/abm/pdfs/News%20Aggregation%20H
andout.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2014). 
 76. See, e.g., Associated Press, supra note 6 (discussing the settlement 
between AP and Meltwater that led to a cooperative agreement between AP 
and the news aggregator). 
 77. See LESLEY CHIOU & CATHERINE E. TUCKER, NEWS, COPYRIGHT, AND 
ONLINE AGGREGATORS 3 (2010), available at http://arrow.hunter.cuny.edu/
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News dropped its use of AP content in 2009 due to an ongoing 
dispute, the traffic to websites containing the AP content 
significantly decreased.78 It is not a surprise that many assume 
news aggregators take away consumer traffic from news 
providers; however research indicates aggregators may actually 
increase traffic to the original site.79 In addition they may lead 
viewers to a wider variety of news providers and increase 
overall news consumption,80 which has been cited by 
policymakers as increasing civic engagement.81 As courts apply 
the Copyright Act and analyze the various fair use factors, it is 
important that the courts acknowledge the public benefits 
provided by news aggregators, all while understanding that the 
news aggregators may actually aid news providers by 
increasing traffic to their websites. 
In recent years there has been an increase in copyright 
litigation brought by news providers against news aggregators, 
but not one case has reached a decision.82 There is likely a 
feeling that neither side could afford an adverse judgment since 
it could have an immense ripple effect across the industry. As a 
policy matter, courts should acknowledge the benefit provided 
to society by news aggregation services, and allow such 
acknowledgement to shape outcomes of copyright infringement 
suits. The judgment rendered against Meltwater U.S. Holdings 
is the first copyright infringement ruling against a news 
aggregator.83 By denying the fair use defense and the existence 
                                                          
media-economics-workshop/conference-papers/chiou%20and%20tucker%
20news.pdf (“Our finding suggests that the aggregation of news content 
actually complements the original content. In other words, users are more 
likely to be provoked to seek the original source and read further when they 
come across a story summarized by an aggregator, rather than being merely 
content with the summary.”); see also Athey & Mobius, supra note 27 
(discussing the research study where French consumers began using Google 
News, which led to an increase in news consumption and traffic to local news 
sites). It is conceded that these examples pertain to Google News, which is 
obviously one of the most widely used aggregation services, and the results 
may not be directly applicable to smaller and less widely used aggregators. 
 78. CHIOU & TUCKER, supra note 77, at 19 (citing a research study that 
showed about a 20% decrease in traffic). 
 79. Id. 
 80. See Athey & Mobius, supra note 27. 
 81. CHIOU & TUCKER, supra note 77, at 4. 
 82. See Neuburger, supra note 31 (discussing recently settled copyright 
litigation by AP and the parent company of the Boston Globe). 
 83. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
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of an implied license, the SDNY sheds valuable light on how 
courts will handle these issues, and may undermine the ability 
of aggregators to serve beneficial public functions. 
II. CASE DESCRIPTION 
It is not surprising that when Meltwater began doing 
business in the United States it assumed it was protected by 
fair use.84 Nevertheless AP filed a copyright infringement suit 
in February 2012, leading to both sides submitting cross 
motions for summary judgment in November 2012.85 The 
Complaint alleged that Meltwater indexed and distributed 
excerpts that were at the “heart” of the copyrighted articles, 
with no licensing agreement.86 However, Meltwater contended 
that it had licensing agreements with websites that did not 
make its information freely available on the Internet, saying 
that they just take free public articles (normally from a licensee 
of AP) without a licensing agreement.87 Meltwater’s relevant 
contentions were that it operates like a search engine, 
therefore expanding public access to information, and that by 
not employing technology to disallow the scraping of its freely 
                                                          
 84. See Defendant’s Answer to Complaint and Counterclaims at 30–31, 
Associated Press v. Meltwater U.S. Holdings, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 2d 537 
(S.D.N.Y 2013) (No. 2:12-CV-01087-DLC-FM) [hereinafter Defendant’s 
Answer to Complaint and Counterclaims] (“Meltwater launched Meltwater 
News in the United States on the understanding that its processes for 
indexing news sources publicly available on the Internet and returning short 
snippets of articles in the form of search results responsive to its users’ queries 
fall within the fair-use doctrine . . . .”). 
 85. Associated Press v. Meltwater U.S. Holdings, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 2d 
537, 548 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). It is worth noting that AP hired a group to inquire 
about a Meltwater subscription, and Meltwater ended up giving the agent a 
free trial. Defendant’s Answer to Complaint and Counterclaims, supra note 
84, at 39–40. AP was asking for statutory damages under 17 U.S.C. § 504, and 
attorney’s fees pursuant to § 505. Complaint at 33, Associated Press v. 
Meltwater U.S. Holdings, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 2d 537 (S.D.N.Y 2013) (No. 12-
CV-01087) [hereinafter Meltwater Complaint]. 
 86. See Meltwater Complaint, supra note 85, at 29–30. The Complaint 
alleges that Meltwater stored all or portions of copyrighted articles since 2007, 
it did not pay licensing fees to AP like some of Meltwater’s competitors, and 
that it was a closed system available only to subscribers, so was in no way 
expanding public access. Id. at 29–32. 
 87. See Defendant’s Answer to Complaint and Counterclaims, supra note 
84, at 34 (discussing how Meltwater has entered into agreements and is 
specifically given permission to access and index news content that publishers 
have chosen not to make freely available to the public). 
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published articles, AP granted an implied license.88 The SDNY 
had to decide whether Meltwater was akin to a search engine,89 
or was a “classic news clipping” service not entitled to fair 
use.90 
A. FAIR USE ANALYSIS 
The court made clear that the purpose of fair use is to 
provide the flexibility needed in order to avoid “rigid 
application” of the Copyright Act that undermines the very 
creativity the statute intends to promote.91 In determining 
whether the use is “fair,” the court was guided by the four 
factors enumerated in § 107, which are: 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such 
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational 
purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount 
and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted 
work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential 
market for or value of the copyrighted work.92 
In line with Supreme Court precedent, the court stated that all 
the factors are to be explored together and weighted to best 
promote the intended purpose of the Copyright Act.93 Finally, 
because fair use is an affirmative defense, the burden of proof 
rested on Meltwater.94 
1. Purpose and Character of the Use 
First, the court analyzed “the purpose and character of the 
use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is 
for nonprofit educational purposes,”95 and found the factor 
                                                          
 88. Meltwater, 931 F. Supp. 2d at 541 (discussing the fair use defense as 
Meltwater’s “principal defense” but Meltwater also argued that it had an 
implied license). Meltwater also had affirmative defenses of equitable 
estoppel, laches, and copyright misuse, but these are not relevant for this 
comment. Id. 
 89. Id. at 541, 556 (assuming for the purposes of the opinion that a search 
engine’s use of copyrighted work was transformative). 
 90. Id. at 561. 
 91. Id. at 550 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 
577 (1994)). 
 92. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
 93. Meltwater, 931 F. Supp. 2d at 550–51. 
 94. Id. at 550. 
 95. 17 U.S.C. § 107; see Campbell, 510 U.S. at 569 (“[W]hether the new 
work merely ‘supersede[s] the objects’ of the original creation, or instead adds 
something new, with a further purpose of different character, altering the first 
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weighed in favor of AP. Essentially the first factor boils down to 
(1) whether or not the use is “transformative”; and (2) to what 
extent it actually transforms the copyrighted work.96 The court 
found the use was not transformative because Meltwater did 
not add commentary or insight, and just automatically 
captured and republished portions of copyrighted works.97 The 
court did not accept Meltwater’s contention that it operates as 
a search engine, stating that there was no evidence offered to 
show that consumers used Meltwater to access the original 
copyrighted works.98 Therefore as opposed to transforming the 
content as a means of promoting access to information, 
Meltwater’s consumers’ use of the service demonstrated it was 
being used as a way of supplanting the need for the original 
news article.99 The court concluded that “the purpose and 
character of Meltwater’s use of AP’s articles weigh against a 
finding of fair use.”100 
                                                          
with new expression, meaning, or message; it asks, in other words, whether 
and to what extent the new work is ‘transformative.’” (citations omitted) 
(quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901))). 
Aside from being transformative, a court is to consider whether it is 
commercial or not for profit, but it has been made clear by the Supreme Court 
that this is more about whether or not the defendant is exploiting the 
copyrighted material without paying the customary price. Harper & Row 
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985). 
 96. Meltwater, 931 F. Supp. 2d at 551. 
 97. Id. at 552. Note that Meltwater is an “automatic” news aggregator, 
and not a “website” that adds commentary or some other form of creative 
value. See supra Part I.A. 
 98. Meltwater, 931 F. Supp. 2d at 554. Courts have generally found search 
engines’ indexing and caching of copyrighted material as transformative since 
it serves the valuable purpose of connecting the public to information. Id. at 
555 (discussing two search engine copyright infringement cases). However, the 
court made clear that Meltwater had a specific burden to show that their 
specific use was fair, not that they just operated as a search engine using the 
same technology and scraping process. Id. at 556. 
 99. See id. at 554 & n.13 (regarding the thirty-three articles in question, 
Meltwater users only “clicked-through” to the original source .08% of the time, 
whereas a source relied on by the court stated Google News had a click-
through rate of 56%). The court concluded that “[i]nstead of driving 
subscribers to third-party websites, Meltwater News acts as a substitute for 
news sites operated or licensed by AP.” Id. at 554. 
 100. Id. at 557. 
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2. Nature of Copyrighted Work 
The court ruled in favor of Meltwater on the second 
factor.101 The court broke down the second factor into two 
separate analyses: (1) whether the work is creative, like a work 
of fiction, or if it is more factual; and (2) whether the work is 
published or not.102 Since the scope of fair use is broader for 
factual reporting (rather than creative works) and for 
published material (rather than more private unpublished 
works), the court ruled in favor of Meltwater and a finding of 
fair use.103 
3. Amount and Substantiality of the Copying 
The court ruled in favor of AP in regards to the third 
factor.104 In analyzing the substantiality of copying, the court 
broke the analysis down into quantitative (the portion taken in 
relation to the whole), and qualitative dimensions (the 
importance of the expressive components taken).105 In terms of 
the quantitative analysis, the court stated that “no bright-line 
rule exists with respect to how much copying is too much.”106 In 
comparing Second Circuit precedent, Meltwater’s use of 
anywhere from 4.5% to 61% of any given article was viewed as 
excessive, in light of the “character and purpose” of the 
secondary use.107 In further supporting this conclusion, the 
court relied on the qualitative aspects of the analysis, stating 
that Meltwater “automatically took the lede from every AP 
story.”108 The court discussed the creative nature of a “lede” as 
it is meant to convey the heart of the entire story and “is a 
sentence that takes significant journalistic skill to craft.”109 
Meltwater tried to argue that the lede was not meant to 
summarize the article, but instead was supposed to serve as a 
“teaser” that draws the reader in.110 The court dismissed the 
argument, saying that if that was the case, it only undermines 
                                                          
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 558. 
 105. Id. at 557. 
 106. Id. at 558. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 558. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 559. 
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Meltwater’s fair use defense since it would further highlight 
the creative and artistic skill necessary to craft an intriguing 
lede.111 Overall, the court ruled in favor of AP on this factor 
because, coupled with the analysis above, Meltwater did not 
offer any evidence to prove that it only used as much as 
necessary to direct users to the original content.112 
4. The Effect of the Use on the Potential Market or Value of 
the Work 
The court ruled in favor of AP on the fourth factor stating 
that the use by Meltwater served as a substitute for the 
original copyrighted work and undermined AP’s ability to fairly 
operate within the market.113 The final prong in § 107 requires 
a court to “consider not only the extent of the market harm 
caused by the particular actions of the alleged infringer, but 
also whether unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort 
engaged in by the defendant would result in a substantially 
adverse impact on the potential market for the original.”114 
More specifically, the analysis hinges on whether the secondary 
use substitutes for the original in the market, not whether it 
suppresses or destroys the market of the original.115 The court 
found that the fourth factor weighed heavily against Meltwater 
since AP obtains licensing fees from businesses within the 
same commercial market as Meltwater.116 Therefore, by not 
paying a licensing fee and operating within the same 
established market, Meltwater gained an unfair competitive 
advantage over other licensees of AP’s content.117 
5. The Aggregate Assessment of All the Factors 
The court rejected Meltwater’s fair use defense, relying 
heavily on the facts that the use was not transformative, 
Meltwater’s business model directly competed with AP, and 
                                                          
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 558–59. The court found it significant that the “snippets” used 
by Meltwater were significantly smaller in its foreign operations. Id. 
 113. Id. at 560–61. 
 114. Id. at 559 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 
590 (1994)). 
 115. Id. at 560. 
 116. Id. at 560–61. 
 117. Id. 
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Meltwater did not pay licensing fees.118 It was irrelevant that 
Meltwater used search engine technology, since the Copyright 
Act still requires an alleged infringer to show that their specific 
use of copyrighted content was fair.119 In sum, Meltwater failed 
to provide enough evidence that the use of AP content was fair 
use. 
B. IMPLIED LICENSE DEFENSE 
Another affirmative defense argued by Meltwater was that 
AP granted an implied license to use its content.120 Meltwater 
argued that because the licensees of AP did not employ 
“robots.txt”121—a protocol which allows each website to 
communicate to Meltwater’s crawler technology not to use the 
content—AP had acquiesced through conduct and granted a 
nonexclusive license to Meltwater to redistribute the 
copyrighted articles.122 The court ruled that AP did not grant 
an implied license to Meltwater because the three required 
elements were not satisfied.123 The court also stated that even 
if other jurisdictional requirements were followed, there were 
practical and policy concerns that weighed against a finding of 
an implied license.124 
                                                          
 118. See id. at 561 (“Examining the four factors individually, and 
considering them as a whole in light of the purposes of the Copyright Act and 
the fair use defense, Meltwater has failed to raise a material question of fact 
to support its fair use defense.”). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. (citing Graham v. James, 144 F.3d 229, 236 (2d Cir. 1998)) (“The 
burden of proving that a license exists falls on the party invoking the 
defense.”). 
 121. Id. at 563. Robots.txt is also known as the Robot Exclusion Standard. 
Id. 
 122. Id. at 563. 
 123. Id. at 563–64; see also supra Part I.C (discussing the implied license 
defense). While it is clear that Meltwater did not meet the three requirements 
[(1) licensee requested the creation; (2) licensor made particular work and 
delivered it to the licensee who requested it; (3) licensor intended that licensee 
copy and distribute], other jurisdictions do not have such guidelines. See supra 
Part I.C. For purposes of this analysis the reasoning provided explains why 
the court denied the defense, even if the elements were not mandatory. See 
Meltwater, 931 F. Supp. 2d at 562 (“Even those courts that do not require 
evidence of each of these three elements do require evidence of a meeting of 
the minds between the licensor and licensee such that it is fair to infer that 
the licensor intended to grant a nonexclusive license.”). 
 124. See Meltwater, 931 F. Supp. 2d at 562–64. 
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The court’s main policy reason in not accepting the implied 
license defense focused on the fact that, if accepted, it would 
shift the burden onto the copyright holder to affirmatively act 
in order to ensure there was no misuse of the copyrighted 
material.125 That would be in contrast to the basic concepts of 
copyright law.126 The court also stated numerous practical 
reasons for dismissing Meltwater’s implied license defense. 
First, there would seemingly be no way to differentiate between 
those crawlers that make fair use of the content and those that 
do not.127 Second, AP and all of its licensees would have to 
constantly update which crawler-utilizing websites were 
allowed and which ones were not.128 Aside from failing to meet 
the required elements,129 the court also found that there was no 
meeting of the minds between AP and Meltwater, and for the 
reasons discussed above, the implied license defense had to 
fail.130 
III. ANALYSIS OF MELTWATER AND IMPLICATIONS 
GOING FORWARD 
Since the application of the fair use defense is to be 
analyzed on a case-by-case basis,131 it is difficult to assess the 
actual impact of the Meltwater decision. Nevertheless, 
Meltwater: (1) may undermine the ability of other aggregators 
                                                          
 125. See id. at 563 (“[W]hat Meltwater is suggesting would shift the burden 
to the copyright holder to prevent unauthorized use instead of placing the 
burden on the infringing party to show it had properly taken and used 
content.”). 
 126. See Jasiewicz supra note 13, at 846; see also Meltwater, 931 F. Supp. 
2d at 564 (stating that “another policy reason” for not using the robots.txt to 
enforce the Copyright Act, is that it would require websites concerned with 
misuse to stop crawlers from using the content, which would run against the 
interests of openness on the Internet). 
 127. See Meltwater, 931 F. Supp. 2d at 563 (“Meltwater has presented no 
evidence to suggest that robots.txt instructions are capable of communicating 
which types of use the copyright holder is permitting the web crawler to make 
of the content or the extent of the copying the copyright holder will allow.”). 
 128. See id. at 563–64 (discussing how the system could automatically 
allow all web crawlers access and just specify which ones were designated as 
denied, but it seems difficult for a website to actively manage an accurate list 
of the crawlers who were to be denied). One of the issues the court had was 
that Meltwater reserved the right to ignore its placement on an exclusionary 
list. Id. at 564 n.21. 
 129. See supra note 123. 
 130. Meltwater, 931 F. Supp. 2d at 562–64. 
 131. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994). 
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to distribute and disseminate information to the public by 
taking too narrow a view of what constitutes “transformative” 
use;132 (2) raises difficult questions about the differences 
between a search engine that is afforded fair use and a news 
aggregator (which employs search engine technology) that is 
not; and (3) raises questions about the feasibility of an implied 
license framework as an alternative to the Copyright Act in 
guiding the relations between content providers and news 
aggregators. 
A. THE COURT INTERPRETED “TRANSFORMATIVE USE” TOO 
NARROWLY AND DID NOT ACKNOWLEDGE THE BENEFITS 
AGGREGATORS PROVIDE TO SOCIETY 
A pivotal factor for the Meltwater court in determining 
whether the use was fair was whether the use was 
“transformative.”133 After all, in regard to the first statutory 
factor under § 107 of the Copyright Act, the Second Circuit has 
made it clear that the most important aspect of a court’s first 
factor analysis is the transformative aspect, not the commercial 
aspect.134 Therefore, if the court ruled in favor of Meltwater on 
the first factor, the outcome of the case may have been 
different.135 Even if the outcome remained the same, the court 
still interpreted “transformative use” too narrowly and did not 
acknowledge the benefit aggregators provide to society,136 
thereby creating precedent that could stifle innovation and 
information dissemination. 
In regard to “transformative use,” the Supreme Court has 
stated that the use should not supersede the original 
copyrighted work, but “instead [should] add[ ] something new, 
with a further purpose or different character, altering the first 
with new expression, meaning, or message; it asks in other 
words, whether and to what extent the new work is 
                                                          
 132. E.g., AP v. Meltwater, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., https://
www.eff.org/cases/ap-v-meltwater (last visited Feb. 25, 2014). 
 133. See Meltwater, 931 F. Supp. 2d at 561. 
 134. Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 608 
(2d. Cir. 2006); see also Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 
F.3d 132, 142 (2d Cir. 1998) (mentioning that the Second Circuit does not give 
weight to the fact that the use was for commercial gain). 
 135. The court ruled in favor of Meltwater for the second factor. See supra 
notes 101–03 and accompanying text. 
 136. See generally Meltwater, 931 F. Supp. 2d at 553 (showing that the 
court does not talk about the public benefit). 
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‘transformative.’”137 The Meltwater court seemed to dismiss the 
idea that the snippets distributed to customers, although not 
creative, were being used for a different purpose even if the 
snippet was unaltered and there was no evidence that 
consumers visited the original article.138 Instead the court 
relied on the fact that customers rarely clicked through to the 
original article, assuming they were using the snippets of three 
hundred characters as a substitute for the original.139 This 
interpretation is too narrow because the Supreme Court has 
specifically mentioned that a use can be transformative if the 
use adds something new “with a further purpose.”140 
In this particular case, Meltwater failed to provide enough 
evidence to show that its customers were using the snippets for 
something other than a substitute for the original story.141 
However, in future scenarios, what if a news aggregator can 
show that its commercial consumers only use the snippets for 
monitoring how frequently it is mentioned in the media and by 
whom? Is that not a different “use”? The SDNY recently held 
that Google’s systematic digitalization of copyrighted books was 
transformative, in part because it changes the text of the books 
into data.142 This was achieved by employing a word index 
function that can search the frequency of any word throughout 
various works.143 Using the technology, one could track the use 
of a word through a set period in an attempt to study language. 
By using the same type of search through the copyrighted 
content, the consumer of a news aggregator can be using the 
exact snippet of text, but for a different purpose than just 
                                                          
 137. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). 
 138. See Meltwater, 931 F. Supp. 2d at 558–59; supra note 4 and 
accompanying text. 
 139. See Meltwater, 931 F. Supp. 2d at 554 (“Instead of driving subscribers 
to third-party websites, Meltwater News acts as a substitute for news sites 
operated or licensed by AP.”). The court mentions that Meltwater made a 
“conscious decision” not to provide evidence in regards to how often their 
customers click through to the original article. Id. 
 140. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. 
 141. See Meltwater, 931 F. Supp. 2d at 554–57 (discussing Meltwater’s 
intentional withholding of information in regards to how its business is 
utilized by customers). 
 142. Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013) (“Google Books is also transformative in the sense that it has 
transformed book text into data for purposes of substantive research, 
including data mining and text mining in new areas . . . .”). 
 143. Id. 
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reading the article. This “further use” should be viewed as 
transformative since consumers of news aggregators may not 
be using the snippet to substitute the need to read the original, 
but for a different purpose. Holding that Meltwater’s use was 
not transformative may create too narrow an interpretation of 
what constitutes transformative use and may stifle the ability 
of news aggregators to disseminate information to consumers 
for different purposes. 
This is not to say that Meltwater, in this specific case, 
actually met its burden of presenting evidence to demonstrate 
the use was fair in regards to the other factors,144 but if the 
court had determined that the use was transformative, the 
outcome may have been different when analyzing all of the 
factors together under § 107.145 Since the Second Circuit, in 
analyzing the first factor, places more weight on the 
transformative aspect, as opposed to the commercial,146 it is 
possible that if the use was ruled transformative, the first 
prong would have weighed in favor of Meltwater. Regardless, 
the court’s interpretation of what constitutes transformative 
use may be too narrow, allowing future cases to rely on it and 
undermine the very fair use protection which should be 
afforded many news aggregators due to the benefit they provide 
society.147 Aggregators increase access to information and 
increase news consumption, thereby leading to a more informed 
populous engaging in civic duties.148 The Meltwater court’s 
narrow interpretation of “transformative” use does not 
adequately take this into account. Courts going forward should 
acknowledge that although some “automatic” aggregators’ use 
                                                          
 144. See supra Part II.A.5. After all, in regards to the fourth prong, 
Meltwater could not show that it was not having a negative impact on the 
market and value of AP’s work. See Meltwater, 931 F. Supp. 2d at 561 
(mentioning that Meltwater side-stepped all arguments in relation to the 
fourth prong and relied on the transformative nature of the use). 
 145. See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
 146. See supra note 134. 
 147. For other issues with the interpretation outside of online news 
aggregators, see AP v. Meltwater News: Summary & Questions, KELLY 
WARNER L. (Apr. 12, 2013), http://www.aaronkellylaw.com/online-intellectual-
property/ap-meltwater-summary-questions/, discussing the possibility that a 
company that produces a monthly newsletter with links to “how-to” articles 
may be engaging in copyright infringement under the logic of the Meltwater 
Court. 
 148. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
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may be “minimally transformative,”149 news aggregators do 
provide a benefit to society.150 
B. WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN GOOGLE AND A SEARCH 
ENGINE THAT EMPLOYS SEARCH ENGINE TECHNOLOGY? 
Meltwater does not give any real guidance in terms of what 
constitutes a search engine, or news aggregator employing 
search engine technology, that is actually afforded fair use and 
one that is not.151 On a more practical level, aside from the 
strict analysis of the fair use factors, the court seemed to 
differentiate Meltwater from other search engines because (1) 
Meltwater’s consumers used the service differently than 
Google’s consumers; and (2) Meltwater was not like other 
search engines since it charged a fee for its service.152 While it 
is true that Meltwater’s service is different than Google’s, 
courts should not rely on these two factors in deciding which 
aggregators using search engine technology are afforded fair 
use, and which ones are not. 
The court stated that although Meltwater utilized search 
engine technology and provided such services to its customers, 
it did not offer “a comparison between the click-through rate for 
any single News Report and the rate for a single Google News 
search or any other search for news conducted through a 
recognized Internet search engine.”153 This means that whether 
or not an aggregator or search engine is afforded fair use may 
hinge not on what the business model is but actually on the 
will of the consumer. For example, if an online business 
provides a search engine service, but most consumers use it for 
                                                          
 149. KIMBERLY ISBELL, CITIZEN MEDIA LAW PROJECT, THE RISE OF THE 
NEWS AGGREGATOR: LEGAL IMPLICATIONS AND BEST PRACTICES 11 (2010), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1670339. 
Isbell states that even feed aggregators provide additional convenience, 
organization, and greater access to news content and information, and 
therefore are, at the very least, “minimally transformative.” Id. 
 150. Not to mention, as discussed in Part I.D., supra, they may even be 
complementing news providers. 
 151. E.g., Nate Raymond, AP Win Against Meltwater Could Impact Online 
News Aggregation, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Mar. 26, 2013), 
https://www.eff.org/mention/ap-win-against-meltwater-could-impact-online-
news-aggregation. 
 152. See Associated Press v. Meltwater U.S. Holdings, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 2d 
537, 553–54 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 153. Id. at 554; see also supra note 99 (discussing the comparison of click-
through rates between Meltwater and Google). 
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something the business did not intend, the online business may 
be liable for copyright infringement. This is unfair to news 
aggregators. 
Another difference the court considered was that 
Meltwater was not open to the public, like Google, and instead 
charged a fee to a relatively small amount of consumers.154 
While this may impact a court’s analysis in regard to the public 
benefit that a search engine or aggregator provides, charging a 
fee should not be used when analyzing whether or not 
copyrighted material is being exploited. For example, is it 
really the case that Google does not profit from advertising and 
exploiting the content of others? Although Google clearly has 
other ventures besides its basic search engine, it had over $15 
billion in revenue just in the final quarter of 2013.155 Google is 
not some non-profit entity that exists to provide public benefits. 
It is one of the most successful companies in the world, whose 
shares are currently trading for well over $1000 on security 
exchanges.156 Again, it is true that Google does not charge 
money for the use of its search engine and therefore is used by 
a much larger portion of the population. However, courts 
should not conclude that because Google does not charge a fee 
in order to use its search engine, it somehow is not exploiting 
copyrighted content in the same way as Meltwater is when 
charging a fee. 
Again, there may be other good reasons and factors that 
differentiate a news aggregator (using search engine 
technology) that is not afforded fair use and a search engine 
that is. However, the difference should rest on how the 
consumer utilizes the service or whether or not they charge a 
fee to consumers. Future courts addressing the issue should 
find other ways to differentiate between a search engine and a 
news aggregator employing the same technology. 
                                                          
 154. See Meltwater, 931 F. Supp. 2d at 553–54. 
 155. Investor Relations, GOOGLE, https://investor.google.com/earnings/
2013/Q4_google_earnings.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2014). 
 156. Google, Inc., WALL ST. J., http://quotes.wsj.com/GOOG (last visited 
Feb. 25, 2014). 
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C. THE FEASIBILITY OF THE IMPLIED LICENSE FRAMEWORK AS 
AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE COPYRIGHT ACT 
In denying Meltwater’s implied license defense,157 the 
court incorrectly reasoned that the robots.txt opt-out system 
would be undesirable even if the more expansive doctrine of 
other jurisdictions was adopted. The expansion of the implied 
license doctrine in the context of the robots.txt framework 
essentially creates an opt-out system on the Internet where 
copyright holders have to affirmatively act to prevent a news 
aggregator or search engine from scraping their content.158 The 
court’s main reasoning for dismissing the implied license 
argument was because it was clear the three requirements, 
utilized by many jurisdictions, were not met.159 This takes little 
analysis, as it is obvious Meltwater fails the first factor by not 
asking AP directly to make the copyrighted articles.160 
However, the court recognized that some jurisdictions do not 
require all of the elements and analyzed the defense under the 
less often used, but more expansive, standard.161 In analyzing 
the issue under the more flexible standard, the court 
incorrectly ruled that the implied license defense would still 
fail and went on to explain that such a standard is not 
desirable or feasible.162 Going forward, courts should more 
seriously consider the robots.txt system and an opt-out 
framework (along with the implied license doctrine) as a 
solution, outside of the Copyright Act, to govern the 
relationships between online content providers and news 
aggregators.163 Having an opt-out system where it is assumed 
                                                          
 157. See supra Part II.B. 
 158. See supra notes 69–71 and accompanying text. 
 159. See Part II.B. 
 160. Compare supra note 66 and accompanying text (describing a common 
standard for demonstrating an implied license, the first factor of which 
requires the licensee to request the creation of the work), with supra note 123 
and accompanying text (describing the Meltwater court’s rejection of 
Meltwater’s implied license defense). 
 161. Associated Press v. Meltwater U.S. Holdings, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 2d 
537, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (discussing the courts that do not require all three 
elements, stating that only a fair inference that the licensor granted a 
nonexclusive license was required, and concluding that Meltwater was unable 
to point to any interaction that would demonstrate that either AP or one of 
AP’s licensees granted a nonexclusive license). 
 162. See id. 
 163. But see Bart Van Besien, Google News Switches to “Opt-In” in 
Germany to Avoid Copyright Fees, NEWMEDIA-LAW (Nov. 7, 2013, 3:16 PM), 
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all news aggregators are entitled to scrape the Internet, unless 
the copyright holder opts out, will create a better balance. It 
will balance the benefits provided by news aggregators and the 
content providers’ desire to single out select aggregators who 
are not benefiting them through increased consumer traffic. 
In analyzing Meltwater’s position under the more 
expansive implied license doctrine, the court denied the 
affirmative defense of an implied license because: (1) placing 
the onus on the copyright holder to opt out of having 
copyrighted material used contradicts the foundations of 
copyright law; (2) there is no way to specify what types of use 
were allowed and which uses were not; and (3) forcing AP or its 
licensees to constantly update their robots.txt protocol every 
time the list of licensees changes is not practical.164 Each 
reason given by the court is analyzed below. 
1. Copyright Owners Have Been Burdened Before 
The Meltwater court stated that placing the burden on the 
copyright holder would go against the foundations of the 
current Copyright Act;165 however, it is not unheard of to place 
an affirmative burden on copyright holders. For example, a 
copyright holder is still required to register with the U.S. 
Copyright Office and deposit the copyrighted works with the 
Library of Congress in order to bring an infringement suit.166 
Although the current Copyright Act does not seem compatible 
with a policy where a copyright holder needs to opt out of their 
content being infringed upon, the Internet presents new 
challenges that could not have been anticipated in 1976. 
Placing an affirmative burden on copyright holders is not 
unusual and could be done in this situation. 
2. Specific Uses Do Not Need to Be Specified 
The Meltwater court stated that there would be no way for 
a website to differentiate what kinds of “uses” it would allow 
                                                          
http://www.newmedia-law.com/news/google-news-switches-to-opt-in-in-
germany-to-avoid-copyright-fees1/, for an example of an opt-in system in 
Germany, where Google now will only display the results of websites and 
content providers who affirmatively opt in. 
 164. Supra Part II.B. 
 165. See supra notes 125–26 and accompanying text. 
 166. See Jasiewicz, supra note 13, at 846–47. 
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and would not allow.167 However, authors of robots.txt files can 
be specific in terms of what content they do or do not want a 
crawler to use.168 Furthermore, by understanding what 
aggregators or websites do not have a licensing agreement to 
use, an author of a robots.txt protocol could just not allow that 
site to use the content, thereby undermining the need to specify 
how a non-paying aggregator or search engine can use the 
content. 
3. Instead of Having a List of Who Is Allowed, Narrow It by 
Who Is Not Allowed 
The Meltwater court acknowledged that the use of the 
robots.txt protocol could be used in a way where the website or 
content provider had a list of all those who were not allowed, as 
opposed to having to constantly “update their robots.txt 
protocol to indicate which web crawlers had permission to visit 
each site’s webpages.”169 While the court says it is hard to 
imagine how a website could keep track of those they do not 
allow, this actually seems quite feasible. Generally, many of 
these websites want web crawlers to aid in the dissemination of 
their content through aggregators and search engines.170 
Therefore it seems completely feasible that instead of keeping 
an updated list of who is allowed, a website or content provider 
can utilize the robots.txt protocol to single out the crawlers 
they believe are exploiting their content by not creating traffic 
back to the original. This would be much easier and more 
efficient than bringing a copyright infringement suit against 
the aggregators or search engines the website did not want 
distributing its content. Also, by creating a default that 
aggregators can scrape information, the system allows for 
further dissemination of information and a more informed 
public. 
                                                          
 167. Meltwater, 931 F. Supp. 2d at 563. 
 168. See Jasiewicz, supra note 13, at 844 (“Authors of robot.txt files can be 
quite specific about what content they do and do not want indexed.”). 
 169. Meltwater, 931 F. Supp. 2d at 564; see also id. at 564 n.21 (stating it is 
difficult to imagine a website effectively managing an accurate list of all 
crawlers roaming the web and which ones are denied access). 
 170. Id. at 564 (discussing how the public and those on the Internet have 
an interest in the “openness of the Internet,” and that denial of access would 
only be limited in certain circumstances). 
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Even though the Meltwater court is justified in ruling that 
Meltwater failed to meet the burden required to demonstrate 
an implied license because it did not meet the three elements 
required under Second Circuit precedent, its reasoning for 
discounting the robots.txt argument is unconvincing. The 
expansion of the implied license defense and the 
implementation of an opt-out system using the robots.txt 
protocol technology should be utilized because it provides 
protection against the exploitation of Internet media, while 
balancing the benefit aggregators provide by further 
disseminating information. Not only would this further the 
purposes of the Copyright Act, but it avoids a situation where 
Congress has to create additional legislation that would be 
subject to First Amendment scrutiny,171 and would allow 
content providers to utilize the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act since any circumvention of the robots.txt protocol would 
constitute a circumvention of a safeguard that controls access 
to copyrighted works.172 In sum, the court incorrectly dismissed 
the robots.txt protocol argument as unworkable, and courts 
going forward should not make the same mistake. 
CONCLUSION 
While it has long been thought that news aggregators were 
protected from news providers by the fair use defense of the 
Copyright Act, Meltwater demonstrates that this may not be 
true. Although this was the first time a judgment had actually 
been rendered against a news aggregator for copyright 
infringement, it is noteworthy that the controversy ended like 
other infringement suits do, just prior to appeal173—with a 
licensing agreement or other mutually beneficial agreement.174 
Therefore, it is unlikely this case will dramatically alter the 
landscape. 
Even if Meltwater does not completely alter the 
relationship between news aggregators and news providers, it 
is important that courts take a more expansive view of what is 
“transformative,” since it is such a crucial part of the fair use 
                                                          
 171. See supra notes 58–59 and accompanying text. 
 172. See supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text. 
 173. Supra Part I.D. 
 174. Associated Press, supra note 6 (discussing the partnership agreement 
that was entered into between AP and Meltwater prior to Meltwater 
appealing the adverse judgment to the Second Circuit). 
2014] ASSOCIATED PRESS V. MELTWATER 1219 
 
analysis. Weighing in favor of news aggregators on the first 
factor will make it more likely that aggregators will be 
protected by fair use. This is desirable because aggregators 
increase news consumption, which leads to wider dissemination 
of information and a more informed public. 
 The court’s analysis does provide some guidance for 
aggregators in order to find protection under fair use. This 
includes the implication that aggregators market themselves as 
a search engine (or just not as a news clipping service) and 
allow as many users to access the website (or service) as 
possible. However, there are still important questions on how 
best to classify an aggregation service that is protected by fair 
use and one that is not. 
Aside from being more flexible in terms of what constitutes 
“transformative use,” courts should more seriously consider the 
expanded implied license defense and opt-out framework 
proposed by Meltwater. This way the aggregators may continue 
to disseminate information broadly, while also giving the 
copyright holder discretion to choose who is using the content. 
This might be the best option for the future, since it is 
questionable if the Meltwater court, in applying the fair use 
factors, is being fair to aggregators. 
  
*** 
